"The war between the U.S. and Iran will be fought in Baghdad"
The U.S. killing of Qassem Soleimani has upended Iraq's already fragile political system. How do Iraqis see the escalating tension between the U.S. and Iran? Jen talks to Iraqi journalist Ghaith Abdul-Ahad about how Iraqis see the conflict, and what it means for Iraqi society.
Note: Ghaith called us from Istanbul, and was joined by his cat, who you'll hear on this recording.
Jen Psaki: 00:00 I'm Jen Psaki, welcome to The World Unpacked.
News Audio: 00:08 President Trump said this was meant to stop a war, not start one, but Iran's already threatening to retaliate. Quasem Soleimani was head of the elite Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and a hugely influential figure in the region. Tensions between Iran and the U.S. Have boiled over. The American embassy in Baghdad has been under siege, as pro-Iranian militiamen and demonstrators tried to breach its walls. In cities across the country, young and mostly unemployed Iraqis, are directing their anger to officialdom. They blame the government for failing to create jobs. There's corruption everywhere. My wife graduated from the same college as me. She's unemployed, there's no work and that's because of corruption in the government. They promise, but they never deliver. The Iraqi parliament has voted to end the U.S. Military presence in the country.
Jen Psaki: 01:08 Ghaith Abdul-Ahad is an Iraqi journalist and a foreign correspondent for the Guardian based in Baghdad. He's been covering Iraq since the U.S. Invasion in 2003.
Jen Psaki: 01:16 You're not the average journalist. You've been embedded with insurgents in Iraq, imprisoned by the Taliban, detained in Libya, but you really got into this line of work as a photographer and observer of what was happening in your country around the time of the invasion in Iraq. So let me start by asking you about how Soleimani was viewed in Iraq and how Iraqis reacted to his death just a few weeks ago.
Abdul-Ahad: 01:38 Well, it's a very mixed reaction. I mean, from one point of view, we have to remember that whatever our position towards Soleimani and our view of Soleimani, Soleimani and his associates and the PMUs, popular mobilization units, or the al-Ḥashd ash-Shaʿbī as we know them in Iraq, were instrumental in the fight against ISIS. I mean, people may accuse them of creating the sectarian divide that led to the creation of ISIS is a different issue. But at one point in 2014, when ISIS were like 30 kilometers from Baghdad, it was Soleimani and the other Shia amateurs who managed to stop the flood of ISIS towards the rest of Iraq. So that's one point. And, and during the war against ISIS, Soleimani was seen as part of this fight against ISIS. But at the same time, Soleimani is also seen as someone who's interfering in Iraqi politics, organizing many of the crises that have took place since 2009, 2011. So it's very mixed feelings about Soleimani, but then since October 2019, we had popular demonstrations against the corrupt political parties in Iraq and there was a crackdown on the demonstrators and the protesters and Soleimani was perceived as the architect or at least an accomplice in that crackdown on the protesters. So I don't think many people, apart from his direct allies, shed a tear once Soleimani was killed.
Jen Psaki: 03:21 And yet one of the immediate reactions, or at least in the perception from the U.S. I suppose, to the death of Soleimani on Iraqi soil was parliament passing a nonbinding resolution, demanding U.S. forces leave the country. Why do you think his death prompted that action?
Abdul-Ahad: 03:38 To understand that reaction we have to go back to October 2019, on the first of October, tens of thousands of Iraqi, some people say hundreds of thousands of Iraqi, came down to the streets to denounce the political system that was created basically by the Americans in 2003. So all the political parties, mostly Shia religious parties allied to Iran, who took over power since 2003, they were seen as the creator of a very corrupt, very dysfunctional government that could not answer the basic needs of the Iraqi people. So you still have these demonstrations and it was a post-sectarian demonstrations i.e., this is a Shia crowd in Baghdad and other southern cities [inaudible] our political system and Shia political parties for two months, for almost three months, these parties and these militias were on the back foot. They couldn't react to these demonstrations. They, it was post-sectarian. They couldn't accuse them of being ISIS.
Abdul-Ahad: 04:44 They couldn't accuse them of being Baathist. And then suddenly, with the attacks on the American bases and then the American retaliation killing 30 Iraqi fighters on Iraqi soil, and eventually the attack on the embassy and the retaliation by killing Soleimani, the whole dynamic shifted. The narrative shifted from people's demonstrations against corrupt parties into a war between Iraq and Iran, and then these militias and the parties regained the initiative, portraying everything happening in the country and portraying every event that led up to there as part of this grand conflict between the U.S. and Iran. And you have to be either with the U.S. or Iran. In the beginning, they tried to point fingers at the protesters saying they're all agents of the American embassy, they're all agents of the Zionists and the Saudis, but they failed. But now they're using Soleimani's killing as a tool to regain initiative. So this is a very important dynamic. This is why Soleimani's killing at this point, this specific point is disastrous to Iraq and to the region. Not because Soleimani doesn't, because people love Soleimani, but the killing of Soleimani destroyed a very genuine political popular movement in Iraq.
Jen Psaki: 06:05 And now is the feeling on the ground that the conflict between the Iranians and the U.S .on Iraqi soil is over, or that there's more to come?
Abdul-Ahad: 06:16 Oh, absolutely. At the moment, people in the streets of Baghdad fear that this is just the beginning of a new conflict between the U.S. and Iran. And what people say in Baghdad is this conflict, this war will not happen in DC or in New York or in Toronto. It's going to happen first in Iraq, on Iraqi soil, and in Basra in the South. And again, Soleimani is a huge figure for these militias, for these paramilitaries and the Shia political parties in Iraq. The killing of Soleimani will have two kinds of reaction: an Iranian reaction, which we just saw two weeks ago last week, the attack on an American base, an Iraq base where American forces are in Iraq, but also there will be another kind of reaction, which is a reaction from the children of Soleimani, from these militias in Iraq.
Abdul-Ahad: 07:13 Each one of those children will try to prove that he is the new kid on the block. He can inherently manage power. So you see, you already see this competition amongst different militia leaders trying to overdo themselves in denouncing the Americans and threatening retaliation against the Americans. For example, Muqtada al-Sadr, who fought the Americans in 2003, 2004 but largely been seen as a moderate, almost an anti-Iranian Arab Shia leader who's very vocal in supporting the protesters in Iraq, now, suddenly he shifted his position. And now Muqtada al-Sadr is calling for these a million people demonstrations against the Americans, threatening to destroy the protest movement to establish himself as a new powerful Shia pro-Irani military leader, an Arab or political leader and era. This is very, very dangerous. We're stepping into unknown territory or actually we're stepping into a very well known territory, because with the beginning of the demonstrations, with the end of ISIS, let's say two years ago, the sectarian war in Iraq almost ended.
Abdul-Ahad: 08:33 The people in the street did not identify themselves as Sunnis and Shia anymore. And we've seen that in the protest at this moment is a new Iraqi identity with the call to expel American troops. We've seen the Shia take one side, one position, or at least the pro-Iranian Shia take one position. The Sunnis and the Kurds suddenly reverted their position from 2000. For the Kurds, their positions towards the Americans. We love the Americans. We don't want them to leave. And the Sunnis, they see the Americans now as a guarantor of their protection, they don't want the Americans to leave. So suddenly you see a crack reappearing in Iraq along sectarian and ethnic lines. Sunnis and Kurds on one side, they want the Americans to stay, and pro-Iranian Shia, who want the Americans to leave. This is again, another danger for the [inaudible].
Jen Psaki: 09:24 Sure. And I haven't heard anyone describe it this way, but, but as you just did it sounded like the, as you called them, children of Soleimani, who are the proxies, as people often hear that term in recent weeks, around the world are, are trying to kind of compete with each other almost to fill the vacuum of leadership or prove themselves. Is that what you were saying?
Abdul-Ahad: 09:48 When I refer to the children of Soleimani I'm talking specifically now. I don't think anyone in Iraq, I don't think anyone in Iraq can fill the position of Soleimani. But what they will try to do now, I mean if we understand the PMUs or these paramilitaries, the popular mobilization units, it's formed of different factions. Some say 70, probably 62, 63 smaller factions. Five of them are very strong and very powerful. And they have fighters probably in the thousands and very well equipped and armed. Each commander of these different factions will try to prove himself as the most lethal, the most pro-Iranian militia commander in Iraq, to become Iran's man in Iraq. And now of course they have their own interests and their own political gains, but also they will compete against each other in trying to sound and look as the most hardcore anti-American.
Abdul-Ahad: 10:55 And this is very dangerous because that's an escalation of a game that we didn't have before the killing of Soleimani. Again, Soleimani was perceived in Iraq as in a very negative term, not only amongst the Sunnis and the Kurds, but also amongst the Shia and especially the protesters in the streets. Killing him in this way, on Iraqi soil, unleashed a series of reactions that we still don't know to which extent it will derail the region. The first direct reaction to the killing of Soleimani is affecting the protest movement in Iraq.
Jen Psaki: 11:32 And when we come back, we'll talk a little bit more about the politics within Iraq, as you've already touched on, and how that relates here.
Jen Psaki: 11:51 I wanted to ask you a little bit about the government of Iraq and how that plays in here. What's the background of the prime minister and kind of where does he fall in on these sectarian divides?
Abdul-Ahad: 12:02 Well, the last elections in Iraq had some of the lowest turnout ever. As I think 19% or 20% of the electoral people you know, went to these elections. So you already had a very unpopular ruling political system. Very corrupt. I mean, I cannot tell you how corrupt Iraq is. It's unbelievable. Ca'n't get anything done in government institutions without a bribe, let alone the big contract, let alone the big businesses. Each of these political parties have an economy committee, which runs its own affairs and businesses and whatnot. So it's a very corrupt political system in Iraq. Now, the prime minister was a compromise prime minister between two or three different factions. He was seen as a weak, he was seen as a compromise, he was seen as not very pro-Iranian but not opposed to the Iranians.
Abdul-Ahad: 12:58 So this is the background of Adil Abdul-Mahdi when he was elected a year ago. He promised a lot to fix the economy, to fight corruption, nothing happened. And then we saw the protest taking place on the 1st of October. From the 1st of October to the 3rd of October 167 Iraqi's died. That's almost the same number of people died in the battle of Mosul in three days. Huge number of unarmed protesters were killed by Iraqi police, Iraqi military, and Iraqi militias. Suddenly that compromise weak fatherly figure of Adil Abdul-Mahdi is perceived as an evil murderer and whatever you want to call him. He is so hated now on the Iraqi streets. So this is where we are now and then comes the killing of Adil Abdul-Mahdi. And we also have to remember that he had resigned his position. He's the head of a caretaker government for the past month. He's not allowed to issue a letter or a law demanding the Americans leave. It's a very difficult situation for Iraq regardless, even before the killing of Soleimani. Add the killing of Soleimani to the situation now, and we have a very volatile situation.
Jen Psaki: 14:11 Tell us a little bit more, I mean, you mentioned corruption and it being rampant in Iraq. What is the relationship, or the impact I should say, of the Iranian-backed militias and Iraqi politics? How should people understand that?
Abdul-Ahad: 14:24 As one very close associate of Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, who's the Iraq commander was killed with Soleimani, was telling me in Baghdad last week, the West and the Americans and the media in general have a wrong impression of Soleimani and the Iranians. It's not like the Iranians can pick up the phone and issue an order and an Iraqi commander or a militia leader will answer this order immediately. It's not a boss and a client situation, it's more influence, it's more negotiation, it's more prodding and pushing towards a certain goal. So it's an alliance, like all alliances in the world it's based on a common interest, which is ultimately the interest of the Shia political system in Iraq and in the region and in Iran. But there are lots of divisions among these militia commanders between themselves and between themselves and the Iranians.
Abdul-Ahad: 15:24 At this moment, all these differences and all these divisions are put aside because it is seen as an existential threat not only to Iran but to the Shia political system in Iraq. So we see some moderate Iraqi Shia, who opposed the Iranian influence in Iraq before the killing of Soleimani lining up and standing in the funeral of Soleimani. This is an existential moment, we have to unify our lives. The only factor that still remains in Iraq as a, not as something resisting Iranian influence, but something trying to limit the role of Iranian political system in Iraq. And this is the Shia clergy in Najaf, mainly Ayatollah Sistani, who is supportive of the protesters and demonstrators and who also trying to limit the role of the Quds Force, people like Soleimani, the military, Iranian military on Iraqi internal affairs because they perceive it as the reason why this political system is so failing in Iraq. I mean, we have to remember, the Iranians have the worst clients in Iraq. Who are the agents of Iran, or the eyes of Iran in Iraq? They are the same corrupt political parties and militias that are accused by their own community of embezzlement, of corruption, of looting, and killing, and whatnot. So this is why it's not an easy black and white situation.
Jen Psaki: 16:57 And I wanted to ask you too about ISIS. One of the fears that people have expressed over the last few weeks is that this would allow ISIS to grow, or to rebuild in Iraq. What is your view of that?
Abdul-Ahad: 17:12 Well, ISIS is there. ISIS was not defeated. The political system of ISIS was defeated. The organization was defeated. But small bands of ISIS affiliates and ISIS fighters still exist in certain parts of Iraq, mainly in the North center of the country. Of course, you know, this kind of conflict between Iran and America will divert attention from fighting ISIS and will give them a breathing space to reorganize and come back. The one, I mean, according to the generals and the officers and militia leaders I talked to, they don't think ISIS can come back the way it existed before as almost a semi-state stretching from Iraq to Syria. But will ISIS come back in forms of bands of fighters attacking just like al-Qaeda used to do a few years ago? Yes, of course. That will happen.
Abdul-Ahad: 18:08 One thing I would like to add in terms of ISIS: the fight against ISIS created this gray zone in Iraq in which both the Americans and Soleimani and his forces could exist. I mean, it's almost the rules of the game for the American-bases in Iraq. Soleimani would have a freedom of movement to go in and out of the country and to organize and run his own militias. So with the killing of Soleimani that understanding was broken. I mean, Soleimani's movement was not secret, Soleimani traveled across the country. Soleimani took selfies, appeared on TV, appeared in documentaries. So it wasn't like a secret, let's say the leader of ISIS moving through the country. No, it was a very publicized movement. So the killing of Soleimani, the breaking of that undeclared understanding, let's say, between the Iranians and the Americans will have repercussions. If you break one side a deal, the other side of the deal will be broken. And this is what we see this push to expel the Americans out of Iraq because that understanding has been broken.
Jen Psaki: 19:21 And when we come back, we'll talk a little bit more about what happens next.
Jen Psaki: 19:32 So I wanted to ask you, you know, one of the arguments on behalf of the killing of Soleimani has been that it will deter bad actors from acting against the United States, or our interest in the Middle East. What is your view on that?
Abdul-Ahad: 19:49 Well, let's try to see it from, and again, I'm an Iraqi, I'm not an Iranian, I'm not an American. But from the Iranian perspective, you see the United States moving towards Iran, you see Iran declared as a member of the axis of evil. You see all the buildup of American troops on Iranian borders. So for a [inaudible] in Iranian perspective, back in 2003, 2004, it was fundamental for them to try to destabilize Iraq, which is really unfortunate for my country. But that was their perspective: to destabilize and to break the American project. And this is what the militia leaders would tell me. This is the pro-Iranian people I talked to tell me that Iran had to act in Iraq to make sure that America would fail in Iraq. And would not take the project of regime-change to Iran.
Abdul-Ahad: 20:40 So that was the Iranian motive in the beginning. But like a lot of what's going on, it's a reaction and a reaction to an action. Soleimani and Iran, unlike ISIS, this is a country, this is a country that you can have a deal with and you already had to deal with. This is a country that you can solve issues with diplomacy. This is a country that if you want to prevent the Iranians acting in Iraq, it was the United States that allowed al-Maliki to become a prime minister again in 2010 and allow the Iranians to have their man in Iraq because America decided to disengage. So it's not as black and white of Iranians trying because they are evil, they're inherently evil, and they are trying to destabilize the United States. A lot of what Iran is doing in Iraq is a reaction to the United States actions in Iraq and towards Iran.
Jen Psaki: 21:42 It sounds like from what you've been saying throughout this interview, there isn't a unified view, but if people in the West are trying to understand what Iraqis are hoping for, what are people misunderstanding in the West about what Iraqis are hoping for as an outcome or over the next few years?
Abdul-Ahad: 22:00 Well, there was a brilliant moment in the modern history of Iraq that started on the 1st of October, 2019 when tens of thousands of Iraqis came out against a corrupt ruling elite, a ruling elite that is pro-Iranian, but a ruling elite that was installed in the first place by the Americans. So what the Iraqis want at the moment is to be spared from being the land of war between the United States and Iran. The Iraqis do not want to end up as another land of war between the United States and Iran. They definitely don't want to have another sectarian conflict in Iraq and they don't want to have other peoples' war in their country. Unfortunately, there are 50 to a hundred thousand well-equipped, well armed pro-Iranian militia men who are ready to fight for Iranian interests in Iraq and that is really unfortunate. The protest was trying to minimize the role of these militiamen and these parties in Iraqi politics and Iraqi affairs. But again, the killing of Soleimani, we empowered them with the killing of Soleimani and really empowered these militiamen and motivated them to take an action to retaliate.
Jen Psaki: 23:17 And before I let you go, I just wanted to ask you too, as a longtime observer of Iraqi politics and Iraq yourself, as well as of conflict in the region and the U.S. presence in Iraq, what do you see as the most likely outcome? I mean, we talked about what Iraqis hope for, but is there anything that gives you hope or that you see as the likely conclusion?
Abdul-Ahad: 23:39 For the first time? I mean, I keep going back to this point of October 2019 because for the first time I as an Iraqi, as a journalist covering the region, I'm kind of like, you only see war and civil wars and conflicts, but then suddenly you had this breeze of hope. I really thought that something really good is going to come out of this protest movement. I mean, of course it's a very difficult situation at [inaudible] there and in that very difficult region, but I had hope that the protests will succeed. At this moment I really fear retaliation. I really feel war. I don't think the war would happen on a grand scale between Iran and the United States. Both countries cannot afford it. Definitely Iranian allies in the region cannot afford it. So what you will have, you'll have this war of attrition, a continuation of the war of attrition, whether sectarian, whether, in whatever shape. And that will happen in Iraq. So this is my prediction for 2020 and the next decade. It's the decade of Iran, the decade of the conflict with Iran, which unfortunately will happen in my country.
Jen Psaki: 24:50 Thank you for joining us on The World Unpacked. We really appreciate your insights and you taking time out of what is a very busy time in the region.
Abdul-Ahad: 24:57 Thank you so much.
Jen Psaki: 25:02 Thanks for listening to The World Unpacked, which is produced by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. You can find us on iTunes or wherever you get your podcasts. For more information and to subscribe, you can find us at worldunpacked.com. Don't forget to rate the show. It helps other people find us. Our audio engineer is Tim Martin and our executive producer is Lauren Dueck.